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Populist parties have become an important factor in opposition politics all over
Europe. While we know a lot about the behaviour of populist parties in the elec-
toral arena and even in the governmental arena, we know surprisingly little about
their behaviour in parliament. This article studies the behaviour of populist oppo-
sition parties in parliament. We hypothesise that it is the anti-elitism of populism
that is the ‘active’ element that shapes their parliamentary behaviour. Anti-elitist
parties are more likely to be ‘responsive’ parties, using parliament as a bully pulpit
to amplify citizens’ objections to policy and less likely to be ‘responsible’ parties,
using the legislature as a place to find support for policy alternatives. We
hypothesise anti-elitist parties to use parliamentary scrutiny tools more often
than other parties. We make use of recently collected cross-national data on par-
liamentary behaviour in seven European democracies to test this hypothesis. Our
results indicate that parties that have been characterised as anti-elitist tend to
vote more against legislation, but they do not ask more parliamentary questions.
Keywords: Parliamentary Questions, Parliamentary Voting, Anti-elitism,
Populism, Opposition
1. Introduction
Since the mid-1990s most European countries have seen the rise of populist poli-
tics: populist parties appeared on the right, like the Danish People’s Party (Dansk
Folkeparti, DF), and on the left, like The Left (Die Linke) in Germany. Populist
parties have become a mainstay of European parliamentary politics. In most
countries, there is a populist party in the opposition. At its core populism focuses
on the political realm: populism is a set of beliefs about the relationship between
citizens and the political elite and the control that ‘the people’ have over this elite.
The study of populism and populists has grown immensely over the last two
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decades. We know a lot about populist parties in the electoral arena (Ivarsflaten,
2005; Hakhverdian and Koop, 2007; Oesch, 2008; Pauwels, 2010; Schumacher
and Rooduijn, 2013; van Kessel, 2013; Bakker et al., 2016; Rooduijn, 2018). We
also know how populist parties behave in government (Heinisch, 2003;
Albertazzi and McDonnell, 2005, 2015; Albertazzi and Mueller, 2013; Andreadis
and Stavrakakis, 2017). Yet, we know surprisingly little about how populist par-
ties behave in parliament, even though these parties are more often in opposition
than in government. The sparing studies that do exist are single-country analyses
(Church and Vatter, 2009; Bobba and McDonnell, 2016; Louwerse and Otjes,
2019). We lack comparative research examining whether the promise of populist
parties to offer a different kind of politics is reflected in their actual work in
parliament.
In order to understand populist parliamentary opposition behaviour, we de-
part from Mair’s (2011) distinction between responsive and responsible politics.
Central in this classification is the distinction ‘between parties that claim to repre-
sent, but don’t deliver and those which deliver, but are no longer seen to repre-
sent’ (Mair, 2011, p. 14). Building on earlier work by Louwerse and Otjes (2019),
we propose that there are opposition parties that approach parliament primarily
as a bully pulpit to express their dissatisfaction with the government (responsive
politics), while other opposition parties approach parliament as a market place to
build majorities to influence policy (responsible politics). This leads to a prefer-
ence for different parliamentary tools. The aspect of populism that makes them
more critical of the government is likely to be their anti-elite attitudes more than
their pro-people views. Therefore, our analysis is directed primarily at the rela-
tionship between anti-elitism and parliamentary behaviour. Our research ques-
tion is to what extent are higher levels of anti-elitism of political parties related to
the use of parliamentary scrutiny instruments?
This article builds on the comparative volume by De Giorgi and Ilonszki
(2018), where opposition party behaviour in parliament is studied in a mix of old
and new democracies. We use the comparative data about opposition behaviour
available from this volume to test our expectations regarding opposition behav-
iour of populist parties.
Our findings indeed suggest that parties that have been classified as more anti-
elitist are more likely to vote against government bills in parliament. They also
ask more parliamentary questions, but this relationship is no longer significant if
we include control variables. We also show that these relationships do not hold
when using a classification of ‘populist’ parties, which suggests that it is indeed
the anti-elitism of parties that translates into a higher use of scrutiny instruments
in parliaments.
In what follows, we will first discuss our theoretical approach to opposition
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we will examine what our country selection means for the external validity of our
research. Subsequently, we will discuss our method of data collection and analy-
sis, in particular the operationalisation of the concepts ‘populism’, ‘anti-elitism’
and ‘political scrutiny’. We will then outline the results of our analysis, before
presenting some conclusions about the link between populism, anti-elitism and
opposition party behaviour in European parliaments.
2. Responsive politics, anti-elitism and parliamentary scrutiny
Parliamentary opposition parties have multiple tools at their disposal to influence
legislation and check the government. Building on the work of Mair (2011) we
conceive of two different opposition styles. Mair (2011) distinguishes between
‘responsive politics’ and ‘responsible politics’. While Mair’s distinction initially
focused on governments, Louwerse and Otjes (2019) argue that the distinction
and tension between responsive and responsible politics also extends to opposi-
tion parties. Opposition parties can voice their opposition to the government and
its policies. This means that parties focus on criticising government policy as well
as on responding to and amplifying societal dissatisfaction with government pol-
icy. This is ‘responsive’ opposition politics, highlighting the representative link
between citizens and politicians. Alternatively, opposition parties can attempt to
use the parliamentary arena to change policy. Policy-making parties focus on
compromise and cooperation with other parties in order to affect legislation.
These parties want to take responsibility for policy. Historically, parties have been
occupied with both responsive politics and responsible politics, and as Mair
(2011) argues, this is preferable from a normative perspective. Increasingly, how-
ever, it seems to have become more difficult to fulfil both these roles, which
means that opposition parties seem to have to prioritise one over the other.
If parties choose to focus on ‘responsive’ opposition, we expect them to focus
their parliamentary behaviour on political scrutiny: that is the ‘assessment of and
political judgement on the appropriateness of [government action]’ (Auel, 2007,
p. 500). By using scrutiny tools, such as asking parliamentary questions and vot-
ing against government legislation, parties will seek to express public dissatisfac-
tion with government policy. This function of opposition is likely to be taken up
by parties that avoid responsibility and focus on responsiveness to voters’
demands (Mair, 2011; Louwerse and Otjes, 2019). This will reflect itself in using
parliament’s right to obtain information, which parties can use to focus attention
on government mistakes or on issues the government is neglecting. In this way,
opposition MPs focus on parliament as a talking parliament (Polsby, 1975), a
bully pulpit where politicians can attempt to direct attention on issues that they
believe matter. Yet scrutiny tools can also be used in the legislative process.
Parties can choose to vote against legislation to signal their opposition to the
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government and the policies it pursues. Of course, one can expect opposition
parties to regularly vote against government bills, but previous research suggests
that in many countries a substantial share of government bills are in fact sup-
ported by opposition parties (De Giorgi and Ilonszki, 2018). While it may be true
that a vote against a bill could be the consequence of the government’s unwilling-
ness to seriously consider any of the opposition parties’ amendments, still we
would argue that voting against government bills more often is a sign of more
critical opposition style. Responsible opposition parties, in contrast, are expected
to focus on policy making (Louwerse and Otjes, 2019).
Louwerse and Otjes (2019) propose that populist opposition parties use their
parliamentary instruments in a different way than other opposition parties. In or-
der to understand why we have to delve in the meaning of the concept ‘popu-
lism’. Within the study of populism, a consensus has developed around the
ideational approach to populism: populism as a thin ideology that revolves
around four claims (Taggart, 2000; Mudde, 2007). First, that the will of the peo-
ple should be the basis for government action. Second, that the people are virtu-
ous and homogeneous. Third, that the current elite is corrupt and acts en bloc to
deprive the people from their right to rule. Finally, the populist politicians seek to
remedy this by giving back the power to rule to government. The terms ‘elite’ and
‘people’ are empty vessels that can be imbued with different meanings drawn
from different ideological traditions. For a left-wing populist party ‘the people’
can be ‘the 99 per cent’ and the elite the ‘1 per cent’ that have a disproportional
amount of economic power. In contrast for a right-wing populist party, the peo-
ple can be the ‘hard-working common man’ and the elite can be ‘the left-wing
elite’ that in their eyes controls cultural institutions such as universities and the
media.
Populism draws a distinction between the elite that it opposes and the people
it seeks to give voice to. These two tendencies come together in populism. Simply
put, populism is anti-elite and pro-people. While some populist parties may em-
phasise one element somewhat more than the other, for a party to be character-
ised as ‘populist’ it should emphasise both. One can be anti-elitist without
supporting more direct influence for the people: a green party, which criticises
the power of the agribusiness complex over political decision-makers but wants
to give voice to the interest of future generations and non-human life, is anti-elite
but not populist. Anti-elite attitudes and a commitment to greater influence of
citizens over political decision-making coincide in populism, but they are con-
ceptually and to a certain extent empirically, distinct. While anti-elitism is not
limited to populist parties, this stance is often particularly strong among them.
Louwerse and Otjes (2019) propose that it is populists’ anti-elitism that fuels
their opposition style. It is that element of populism, which sets them against the
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well with the goals of anti-elitism. They can use these tools to mark clearly that
they are opposed to the ruling elite and their policies. By using these tools, they
seek to expose the supposedly corrupt practices of the elite. They can use them to
direct attention to issues that the elite ignores. They can use them to give voice to
segments of society that the elite supposedly wants to silence. This leads to the
following hypothesis:
Scrutiny Hypothesis: The more anti-elitist an opposition party is, the
more it will make use of scrutiny tools.
While we expect a higher use of all scrutiny tools by anti-elitist parties, we ac-
knowledge that asking written and oral questions and voting in parliament are dis-
tinct tools. Voting is more or less unavoidable for parties. Parties therefore have to
choose, but this also means that the direct cost of voting against the government is
relatively low, particularly for parties that do not have high hopes of joining one
of the current government parties in a future government (Louwerse et al., 2017).
Asking written questions requires some more effort on behalf of the MP, but in
most parliaments there are few limitations on asking written questions (Russo and
Wiberg, 2010). More limitations usually apply for oral questions, if only because
of limited floor time in the chamber. Still, parties can use the instruments that are
available to them to a higher or lower degree. Apart from the cost of using these
tools, their function is also different. Voting against legislation, while often incon-
sequential, provides a clear confrontational signal. Parliamentary questions, on
the other hand, can be used for a variety of purposes, such as gathering informa-
tion, agenda setting and highlighting mistakes of scandals, which vary in the extent
to which they can be seen as confrontational. Therefore, we would expect to see
the strongest relationship between anti-elitism and voting behaviour.
If we want to study the effect of anti-elitism on the use of scrutiny tools, we
need to consider a number of confounding factors. We include a number of con-
trol variables in the analysis. The first control variable is the ideological distance
between and opposition party and the government (Hix and Noury, 2016;
Louwerse et al., 2017; Louwerse and Otjes, 2019). A left-wing opposition party is
likely to behave differently when dealing with a right-wing government than deal-
ing with a left-wing government. Given that it is more likely to agree with the
left-wing government, they are less likely to offer criticism in that case. In general,
we expect that the greater the distance between the government and an opposi-
tion party, the more likely that the opposition party will use scrutiny tools.
Secondly, we expect that the extent to which parties have experience in gov-
ernment will inform their likelihood to use opposition tools. Where it comes to
the use of scrutiny tools, one would expect that a party that has tasted govern-
ment power will likely want to return to it (Louwerse and Otjes, 2019). In a coali-
tion system, a return to power depends on the willingness of other parties.
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Therefore, keeping cordial relations with the government is a good idea under
those circumstances. Thus, parties that aspire to return to government will refrain
from overusing scrutiny tools. Moreover, compared with an opposition party
that has just been in government, permanent opposition parties are probably
more proficient at employing scrutiny tools and will therefore use them more. All
in all, we expect that the longer an opposition party has been in government pre-
viously, the less likely it is to use scrutiny tools.
The final control variable is capacity (Louwerse and Otjes, 2019). There is a
limit to how many issues a party can have a position on. That limits the number
of issues a party scrutinises the government on. We expect that as opposition par-
ties become larger, the use of parliamentary questions, expressed as an average
per Member of Parliament, declines.
3. Case selection: parliamentary tools, countries and parties
This study uses the data that were collected as part of the ‘Opposition parties in
European legislatures’-project (De Giorgi and Ilonszki, 2018). This study is an
important landmark in the study of parliamentary opposition, because it is the
first effort to bring together data about how parliamentary parties use their par-
liamentary tools beyond parliamentary voting. We examine three scrutiny tools
that are covered in that volume: asking oral and written questions in parliament
and voting against legislation. These belong to the most prominent scrutiny tools
parties have: parties that are critical of the government can vote against the bills
the government proposes or they can use parliament as a bully pulpit to make
their criticism heard. They reflect scrutiny in two different aspects of parliament:
its legislative and its oversight function. We limit our case selection to the coun-
tries that were part of that volume and where data on at least one of the tools we
examine are available.1 It is important to understand what effect this selection has
on the generalisability of the result of the analyses.
Table 1 provides a number of characteristics of the party systems of included
and excluded country cases in Europe. The first is the number of parties, which
may influence the opposition strategies by affecting the likelihood of forming
coalitions in the future and by increasing the number of parties in opposition.
The average in both the included and the excluded set out countries is four. The
minima of the number of parties (just above 2.5) are similar. Only one country
(Belgium) has more parties than the maximum of the sampled countries.
Experience with democracy may also influence the nature of the opposition, as
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opposition styles may be learned over time. The selection includes a similar share
of established West European democracies and more recently democratised
Central and Eastern European countries as the other countries. At the party level,
two variables are key: populism and ideology. We look at the presence of left-
wing and right-wing populist parties. Seventy per cent of countries in our sample
have a right-wing populist party. This is 85% outside of the sample. Half of the
Table 1 Party system characteristics of the included and the excluded countries
Country ENPP CEE-west Anti-elitista
Right Left
Included
Czech Republic 5.81 CEE Yes Yes
Denmark 5.86 West Yes No
Spain 2.60 West No Yes
Germany 3.51 West Yes Yes
Hungary 2.62 CEE Yes No
Italy 3.48 West Yes No
Netherlands 5.71 West Yes Yes
Poland 3.00 CEE Yes No
Portugal 2.93 West No Yes
Romania 4.47 CEE No No
Average 4.00 40% CEE 70% 50%
Excluded
Austria 4.59 West Yes No
Belgium 7.83 West Yes No
Bulgaria 5.40 CEE Yes No
Croatia 4.03 CEE Yes Yes
Cyprus 3.60 West No Yes
Estonia 3.84 CEE Yes No
Finland 5.83 West Yes No
France 2.86 West Yes Yes
Greece 3.76 West Yes Yes
Ireland 3.53 West No Yes
Latvia 5.13 CEE Yes No
Lithuania 5.47 CEE Yes Yes
Luxembourg 3.93 West Yes No
Malta 1.97 West No No
Norway 4.40 West Yes No
Slovenia 4.16 CEE Yes Yes
Slovakia 2.88 CEE Yes Yes
Sweden 4.99 West Yes No
Switzerland 5.58 West Yes No
United Kingdom 2.58 West Yes No
Average 4.31 35% CEE 85% 40%
ENPP data based on election results closest to but before 2014. aBased on the Chapel Hill Expert Survey, with
parties scoring five or higher on the anti-elitism measure.
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countries in the sample had a left-wing populist party. This is 40% of countries
outside of the sample. All in all, we can argue that the set of countries included in
this article is roughly representative for the population of European countries.
The selection of countries implies a selection of parties. What parties constitute
as populist is the subject of a lively debate in political science (Rooduijn, 2019). In
our analysis, we use two different indicators: the Chapel Hill Expert Survey
(CHES) and the PopuList (Rooduijn et al., 2019). The CHES represents an assess-
ment of about a dozen political scientists (on the average) working on party poli-
tics per country (Polk et al., 2017). The PopuList is the collaborative work of
prominent populism experts. The CHES measure specifically concerns anti-elit-
ism, which we believe is the ‘active component’ of populism that underlies their
opposition behaviour. The PopuList concerns the full ideational approach to pop-
ulism. In our analysis, we will focus primarily on the CHES anti-elitism indicator,
but we will replicate all of the analysis with the PopuList indicator to check to
what extents there is a difference between the impacts of the two variables.
Table 2 show how these two classifications match. In this illustration, we use a
cut-off of five to split anti-elitist and other parties in the CHES. Nine parties can be
classified as both populist (according to the PopuList) and anti-elitist (according to
the CHES). This includes the Partij voor de Vrijheid, Lega Nord and Jobbik on the
right, as well as the German and Dutch left-wing populist parties Socialistische
Partij and Die Linke and the Italian Movimento 5 Stelle that defies left-right classifi-
cation. Forty-two parties are neither populist nor anti-elitist. These are mainstream
parties of the left and right, as well as many Green and regionalist parties. The
PopuList and the CHES differ in their description of 13 parties. For instance, the
Hungarian Fidesz and Forza Italia score below 5 on the CHES anti-elitism scale but
are populist according to the PopuList. The anti-establishment rhetoric of these
parties is likely tempered by the fact that they have been government parties. The
PopuList and the CHES also differ where it comes to communist and left-socialist
parties, such as Izquierda Unida. These parties may criticise the elite, but do not
necessary treat the people as unified; they subscribe to a Marxist analysis that sees
the people stratified in a working and an owning class. The Czech and Hungarian
Green parties, Dutch advocacy parties for pensioners and animals and the Czech
conservative party and the Spanish social-liberal party fall in the same category. All
in all, populism and anti-elitism are not just theoretically distinct concepts but also
empirically: there is a strong but far from perfect correlation between the PopuList
and the CHES anti-elitism measure (r¼ 0.60, p< 0.01).
4. Data and methods
To measure opposition party behaviour in parliament we use the data collected
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Ilonszki (2018). Our unit of analysis is an opposition party during a government’s
term. The exact periodisation is dependent on the data for the various countries
included in the De Giorgi and Ilonszki (2018) volume. For each country data are
available for at least two parliamentary terms in the period 1991–2017.
We look at three dependent variables: the share of votes in favour of government
bills, the number of oral questions asked by a party and the number of written ques-
tions asked.2 The number of oral and written questions is calculated as the average
number of the questions that that MPs of a party ask, per MP per year. The share
of favourable votes is recorded on the party level in De Giorgi and Ilonszki
(2018), because voting unity in parties is usually very high in all countries.3,4
Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics and the country selection of the dependent
variable as not every variable is available for every country Table 4 shows the





<5 All others Forza Italia (FI, IT)
Fidesz (HU)





Bloco de Esquerda (BE, PO)
Izquierda Unida (IU, ES)
Strana Zelenych (SZ, SK)
Lehet Más a Politika (LMP, HU)
50PLUS (NL)
Partij voor de Dieren (PvdD, NL)
Obcanská Demokratická Strana (ODS, CZ)
Unión Progreso y Democracia (UPyD, ES)
Dansk Folkeparti (DF, DK)
Prawo i Sprawiedliwosc (PiS, PL)
Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, NL)
Fratelli d’Italia (FdI, IT)
Jobbik (HU)
Lega Nord (LN, IT)
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, IT)
Die Linke (DL, DE)
Socialistische Partij (SP, NL)
Note: Party abbreviations and country codes in brackets.
2All these variables are available at the party-government level except for written questions in the
Czech Republic; there data are only available for the entire parliamentary term, but we still use these
data nevertheless.
3Note that some countries treat abstentions (a relatively rare phenomenon) differently. In Italy and
Germany, these are counted as voted ‘Yes’. In the other countries, they are counted as voted ‘No’. In
the Netherlands such votes are impossible.
4A fractional logit model would have been more appropriate, but the data reported in De Giorgi and
Ilonszki (2018) only report the percentage of favourable votes, not the total number of votes.
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correlations between the measures. This indicates that the measures are not
identical.
Anti-elitism is our key independent variable. We operationalise this variable by
means of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)’s measure of anti-elitism, which
we discuss earlier.5 This item is a scale, which allows us to distinguish between
parties that offer a mild form of anti-establishment critique from those parties
that are vehemently poised against incumbents. It is available in the 2014 CHES,
but we use the measure for the 1991–2017 period.6 Unfortunately, the CHES
2017 round, which includes a number of additional measures of populism, does
not cover all our countries. It is crucial to note that our expectation explicitly
concerns anti-elitism and not populism in a broader sense. We will use the binary







Mean 67.60 2.16 17.64
Median 75.05 1.28 9.21
S.D. 26.27 2.81 23.68
Min. 0 0 0
Max. 100.00 24.82 122.80
N 253 134 104
Countries CZ, DK, DE, HU, IT,
NL, PL, PT, RO, ES
CZ, DE, HU, NL, RO, ES CZ, NL, PT, RO
CZ, Czech Republic; DK, Denmark; DE, Germany; HU, Hungary; NL, Netherlands; PL, Poland; PT, Portugal; RO,
Romania; ES, Spain.
Table 4 Pearson’s correlations between the dependent variables
Oral questions Written questions
Vote –0.16* –0.21**
Oral questions 0.10
*p< 0.1, **p< 0.05, ***p< 0.01.
5The anti-elitism scale is based on the survey question ‘Salience of anti-establishment and anti-elite
rhetoric’ with an answer scale ranging from 0 (No important at all) to 10 (Extremely important).
6In the case of mergers (like CDU/CSU in Germany) we use a weighted average. In the case of joint
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PopuList measure, mentioned above, to check this. We explicitly expect that this
measure has a weaker relation to parliamentary behaviour.
To measure the ideological distance to the government, we use the left-right
positions from expert surveys, specifically the CHES (before 1999 also the Huber
and Inglehart [1995] survey). We use the left-right dimension because this is still
the universal dimension, which reflects the ideological conflict in European de-
mocracies (Mair, 2007). We use the general left–right dimension, which can tap
into economic, moral and migration issues depending on which issues are most
salient in political systems. We assign a party-per-government the CHES value
that closest to the year the parliament was elected. If two years are equally close,
we chose the more recent year. We assume that the data are applicable for a 10-
year period.7 We then calculate the seat-weighted average of all the cabinet parties
to measure its position. For each opposition party, we then calculated the abso-
lute distance to the cabinet.8
To measure government history, we use the ParlGov database and calculate the
share of days a party was in existence since the Second World War and it also was
in government (Döring and Manow, 2018). Finally, we also measure the share of
seats a party has in parliament (from the ParlGov data base).9 To ease interpreta-
tion all independent variables have been recalculated so their minimum is zero
and their maximum is one. Table 5 provides descriptive statistics for our inde-
pendent variables.
We ran a number of regression models, two for each dependent variable. In
order to exclude any unobserved between-country differences from the analysis,
we ran country fixed-effects regression models. In those models, the values of the
dependent variable are divided by the average value in the country. This
completely removes inter-country differences and focuses on the analysis on the
intra-country differences, which are the focus of our theory. This is important be-
cause there may be country-specific institutional rules concerning how MPs can
use their instruments. We ran negative binomial regression models for the ques-
tion data as these are either based on counts or clearly skewed; we ran a fixed-
effects least-squares regression for the voting data. The Online Appendix provides
a number of alternative model specifications.
7If data for a specific party are missing from CHES wave but present in an earlier or later wave, we use
the data that are available, even though the year from which the data were obtained differs between
parties.
8There is only a moderate correlation between anti-elitism and left-right distance (r¼ 0.28, p < 0.01).
9Except for periods when a government was not formed after elections, but after a cabinet crisis, then
we relied on the country chapters in De Giorgi and Ilonszki (2018).






/pa/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pa/gsab027/6224229 by guest on 11 M
ay 2021
5. Results
Before turning to our analyses, we will look at the average scores of different
groups on parliamentary tool use. We distinguish between the four groups in
Table 6: parties that are anti-elitist and populist according to the CHES and the
PopuList, parties that are either one of these things and parties that are neither.
Table 6 shows how often they use their parliamentary instruments. We start by
looking at parties that both the PopuList marks as populist and the CHES as anti-
elitist. This group does not score exceptionally in its use of parliamentary tools:
they score lowest in asking oral questions and support almost two-thirds of bills.
There is a higher use of opposition tools in the group that is anti-elitist according
to the CHES but not populist according to the PopuList. This group asks most
written and oral questions and supports half of all government bills. Fidesz and
Forza Italia, the parties that the PopuList scores as populist but which are not
anti-elitist according to the CHES, support the lowest share of government legis-
lation. All these three groups differ from the fourth group of non-populist parties
in particular in their lower support for legislation.
To assess the effect of anti-elitism on parliamentary behaviour, we ran a num-
ber of analyses: a bivariate regression and subsequently a multivariate regression
for each dependent variable (see Table 7). In the three bivariate regressions (mod-
els 1, 3 and 5), we can see that CHES anti-elitism is significantly associated with
the usage of scrutiny tools in parliament: anti-elitist ask more oral and written
questions and vote against legislation more often. The multivariate regressions
(models 2, 4 and 6) add the control variables. In the regression of bill support the
significant effect of anti-elitism remains: on average the most anti-elitist support
20% less legislation than a party that does not use any anti-elite rhetoric. The re-
lationship between anti-elitism and both types of questions is not significant,
however, if we include control variables. This implies that the difference in ques-
tioning behaviour of anti-elitist parties is likely to be the result of other factors
such as their left-right position.
Table 5 Descriptive statistics of independent variables
Variable Mean Median SD Min. Max. N Higher
Seat share (logged) 0.54 0.51 0.27 0.00 1.00 280 A high share of seats
Left-right distance 0.35 0.34 0.19 0.00 1.00 283 Distant from the government
Government experience 0.21 0.00 0.26 0.00 1.00 288 Long government experience
PopuList rating 0.22 – – 0.00 1.00 289 Populist
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The Online Appendix includes a number of alternative model specifications,
14 for the share of government bills supported (Tables A1 and A2 in the Online
Appendix) and 10 for the number of oral questions (Table A3 in the Online
Appendix) and 10 for the number of written questions (Table A4 in the Online
Appendix). We look at applying linear models analysing the questions and bino-
mial models to the government bills, as well as multilevel models instead of fixed-
effects models. Four models employ beta regression with clustered standard
errors to look at the proportion of votes supported. Twenty of 34 models employ
the PopuList rating as an alternative for the CHES anti-elitism scale. This rating
is only a significant predictor of supporting government bills in multilevel regres-
sions and not for models asking questions. This supports the findings presented
above.
Concerning the control variables included in the models, we find a strong rela-
tionship between the opposition party’s left-right distance to the government and
both opposing the government in votes and asking it questions. This is significant
in each of the models. This supports the notion that politics in Europe’s parlia-
ments still very much reflects left–right differences. Moreover, parties that have
less government experience tend to oppose the current government more in
votes. For the other variable (seat share) we do not find significant results.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Our article offers the first comparative quantitative analysis of opposition party
behaviour of anti-elitist and other parties. Based on earlier work focussing on the
Dutch case, we expected to find that anti-elitist parties were more likely to engage
in scrutinising behaviour, such as asking written and oral questions and voting
against legislation. Anti-elitism, more than populism in general, appears strongly
associated with voting against government legislation but where it comes to
Table 6 Average scores for four groups
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4
CHES anti-elite 5 5 <5 <5
PopuList rating Yes No Yes No
Share of government legislation supported 66.6 50.9 37.71 78.3
(28.4) (25.9) (9.9) (19.9)
Oral questions 1.9 3.2 2.3 2.0
(2.3) (5.4) (0.8) (2.1)
Written questions 17.9 21.4 – 16.2
(17.7) (31.4) – (22.0)
N 53 74 10 149
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asking written and oral parliamentary questions, ideological distance to the gov-
ernment is a better predictor.
It is a relevant question why anti-elite parties are more likely to prefer using
one scrutiny tool in their toolbox but not others. Perhaps the best explanation is
that voting against legislation does not involve any meaningful costs, while asking
written or oral questions requires more ‘work’. If something requires effort par-
ties are more inclined to do it when they are motivated not just by their distaste
of the elite but also by substantial differences to the government.
We draw three conclusions from these findings. First, this article shows that
we can fruitfully study opposition party behaviour in a comparative, quantitative
analysis. Even more than anti-elitism, ideological distance plays a major role in
understanding opposition party behaviour. In this sense, this article reflects ear-
lier findings by Hix and Noury (2016) and Louwerse et al. (2017): ideological dif-
ferences, operationalised as distances on the left–right dimension still are the key
variable for understanding parliamentary behaviour. Future research may want
to explore in greater detail how ideological differences affect parliamentary be-
haviour, in particular the use of parliamentary tools beyond voting.
The second conclusion concerns the comparative analysis of parliamentary be-
haviour: the statistical models employed completely removed inter-country dif-
ferences and focused on the analysis on the intra-country differences, which were
the focus of our theory. Still there also appears to be considerable relevant varia-
tion between countries as to what scrutiny tools are used. We have left this varia-
tion unexplored, but this could be fruitful to look more closely at this in future
analyses. At the same time, we need to make sure that the data obtained for differ-
ent countries are truly comparable. This requires increased data sharing efforts
within the political science community. The comparative volume by De Giorgi
and Ilonszki (2018) provides a very important step in this process, but we hope
that this will be a first step towards a more comparative approach of parliamen-
tary (opposition) behaviour.
Finally, where it comes to the concept of populism: the ideational approach to
populism that conceives of it as combining anti-elite and pro-people attitudes
has become dominant in the literature. We found that disaggregating populism is
useful, at least where it comes to understanding parliamentary behaviour. We
found that while measures of populism that combine these two elements are only
weakly related to parliamentary behaviour, anti-elitism has a strong, significant
and positive relationship to the use of opposition tools, in particular to parlia-
mentary voting. Left-wing anti-elitist opposition parties that still employ a class-
based schema to understand society score very high on their use of opposition
tools. This makes sense from a theoretical perspective: the unwillingness to coop-
erate with the sitting government is conceptually more closely related to anti-elite
attitudes than to pro-people attitudes. This provides evidence for the assumption
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of Louwerse and Otjes (2019) that the working element of populism where it
comes to parliamentary behaviour is anti-elitism. Future research about opposi-
tion strategy could be focused more on anti-elitism instead of the broader con-
cept of populism. More in general, the growing attention to populism in the
literature on political science is warranted given the growth of these political cur-
rents all over Europe; however, the exclusive focus on populism as a broad con-
cept may obscure the importance of the underlying concepts, in particular anti-
elitism.
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